V-FORCE Questions

[efiste2]

As i watch and read more and more info on the Aircraft and operation of the V-Force, i find the subject fascinating. Can anyone shed any light on a few queries i have,

When or if the AIRCRAFT were dispersed to other airfields in times of high tensions, would they have carried the nuclear weapons with them. or would they have been transported separately....
Is it correct that at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the crews were actually camped next to the aircraft on the 2 minute readiness alert....awating the the word to SCRAMBLE..(or is this exagerated for TV)
Were the Victor and Valient capable of being airbourne as fast as the vulcan on the scramble call, ie with all four engines being started up and airborne in 3 mins etc etc.


Please ecuse my nieveity in this subject as i have watched a few DVDS on the VFORCE latelty and may have fell victim to a few made for TV myths

[Robert Hilton]

I can tell you that the Victor had a rapid start system fitted. When I served on them (K2's) the starboard side had been removed but the port side was still active.

[exmpa]

When or if the AIRCRAFT were dispersed to other airfields in times of high tensions, would they have carried the nuclear weapons with them. or would they have been transported separately....

I can only speak about the Mk2 days. We would have deployed with the weapon on board but in transit configuration. On arrival at the dispersal airfield the aircraft would be refuelled and the weapon made "Live".

As far as the QRA Readiness States were concerned (AFAIK they were the same for the MK1 Vs) they were as follows:

Readiness State 15 minutes (RS15). Crews capable of takeoff in 15 minutes. This could mean being close to the aircraft (running distance!) or somewhat further away if we had transport. The actual arrangements varied considerably but if transport was required then it was part of the unit establishment. RS15 could be held for days. In fact in during an exercise in 1971 the dispersal at Bedford was held on RS15 for 30 days.

RS05. Crews in aircraft with electrical power on and/or APU running. This RS assumed that aircraft were parked on an Operational Readiness Platform or close to the runway. Under exceptional circumstances it might have been necessary to taxi and then shut down at a holding point. IIRC the limit for RS05 was 5 hours.

RS02 All engines running on the ORP or lined up on runway. External supplies and telebrief removed unless rigged for snatch disconnect. RS02 was expected to be held only for "minutes".

exmpa

[efiste2]

FASCINATING info, thanks for sharing that, if i may trouble you with another question, what lengths of time did spend fully suited up. ie was if for the whole shift, and if so how long was that. in an interview on the return to the skies docu shown on sky. an electronics officer recalls difficulty in sleeping in what amounts to a 3 layered suit with some sort of cooling system built in and connectors everywhere ..............

[exmpa]

an electronics officer recalls difficulty in sleeping in what amounts to a 3 layered suit with some sort of cooling system built in and connectors everywhere ..............

I presume that that was when he was in the aircraft!

On QRA at RS15 you normally wore flying suit and appropriate underwear. I can't recall anyone bothering with the Air Vent Suit on Q. You usually slept in the underwear (long coms and shirt, later replaced by the rollneck) and just pulled your suit and boots on if needs be. QRA normally lasted 24hrs/crew but as I said above you could be held on RS15 for up to 30 days.

Picking when to take a shower was an important decision, get it wrong and you could find yourself wearing a wet soggy flying suit for a couple of hours.

exmpa

[efiste2]

great info, i guess he was exagerating for TV purposes. I hope you dont mind me firing these questions at you, Did you have any dealings with the ECM onboard the VULCAN, One documentory describes having to give 24hrs warning of operating certain ECM, as it knocked out TV reception across a certain area. And yet another question, during your service on the V FORCE what type of weapons were the aircraft armed with. Nuclear dropped/stand off or other types of weapon, seeing as the Detterent had switched to submarines in 69. (again anohter fact learned form the TV so apologies if its pie in the sky)
Sorry to bombard you but its a real treat to be able to ask questions to someone who has actually got the T shirt etc etc, so thanks again

[exmpa]

Vulcan ECM

During my time on the Vulcan Mk2 we were fitted with the following:

Blue Diver
Green Palm
3 x Red Shrimp (Red Shrimp 3 was progressively replaced by an "L" Band jammer)
X Band Jammer (initially rear facing but modified with a Janus aerial to give front hemisphere capability)
Red Steer (tail warning radar - Mk1 progresively replaced by Mk2)
Blue Saga, Passive warning Receiver
Chaff and Infra Red Decoy(flares) dispensers. These were mounted internally in the inner wing section aft of the undercarriage bays.

We were very limited in when and where we could use active ECM and it was very rarely used on exercises. We did carry out monitor runs against a signals unit on Stornoway to assess the serviceability and power output of the equipment and the X band jammer was used during fighter affiliation exercises.

The equipment was quite capable of affecting TV reception and their were stories of this happening, but some may be apocryphal so beware. There is quite a lot of information on the internet on the subject and judicious use of Google will reveal much.

Weapons
The primary weapons on the Mk2 were the WE177 gravity bomb and the Blue Steel missile. Blue Steel was confined to the Scampton squadrons and was out of service by 1972 (I think). The last Blue Steel course on the OCU was in 1969, a friend of mine was very relieved to have avoided being on it. The Blue Steel aircraft were reconverted to "free-fall" when the missile was withdrawn. The early Mk2s must have utilised the Yellow Sun Mk2 for a short time until the WE177 became available. Again, Google is your friend on this subject. The Red Beard weapon was available, but I don't believe that it was ever a primary weapon for the V Force. We were trained on it, but only as a secondary option. Red Beard training ceased in 1970.

Although the V Force was stood down from QRA in 1969 we retained a committment to be able to generate a QRA force at very short notice. Every squadron had a crew on one hours notice to report from being called. This was in the days before mobile phones or reliable pagers and meant that the duty was quite onerous, effectively confining you to home for the day. If you went into Lincoln, you were in and out of phone boxes every 20 minutes or so to check that you were not required. It was easier to just stay at home!

exmpa

[efiste2]

Thanks mate, thats a real invaluable insight into the VFORCE, ill stop pestering you now

[sealordlawrence]

Great thread everybody. It is fantastic to hear such detail from such experienced people so thank you all for your contribution and for the thread opener for coming up with such a 'good one'. Just one question if you dont mind, how well regarded were the ECM systems? Were they considered capable of keeping a Vulcan alive long enough to get to an intended target behind the Iron Curtain? I dont know whether anyone will be able to answer this but what were the intended targets for the V-force in the 1970's, were ambitions scaled back as the Soviet air defence network became more competent?

Thanks again everybody!

[exmpa]

how well regarded were the ECM systems? Were they considered capable of keeping a Vulcan alive long enough to get to an intended target behind the Iron Curtain? I dont know whether anyone will be able to answer this but what were the intended targets for the V-force in the 1970's, were ambitions scaled back as the Soviet air defence network became more competent?

There is much more to your question than you might realize. Firstly it is necessary to understand the guiding principle upon which Britain’s independent deterrent was based. It was to maintain a force capable of inflicting an unacceptable degree of damage upon a potential enemy in event that they attacked the UK. To put it simply, it meant the ability to effectively destroy Moscow. Other major cities would also be targeted, but Moscow would have priority.

The war plans fell into 2 categories, National and SACEUR. The National plan was a go it alone scenario, unlikely I know but it was the justification for the independent UK nuclear capability. The SACEUR Plan was a fully integrated plan that involved coordination of all strike forces. Obviously the latter plan was much larger and the range and type of target more varied. Crews were allocated targets under both plans. You only knew your own targets and no others but it would seem reasonable that there was some degree of duplication to ensure that priority targets were covered. Both plans were subject to regular review and revision and the targets allocated to individual crews would change. In addition there were the QRA targets which for obvious reasons had to be common to at least a number of crews. These targets would have to be constantly covered by the QRA force.

Targeting and tactics obviously evolved in response to improvements in air defence capability. The switch from high level to low level penetration is a prime example of this process. As I mentioned above, the plans were constantly reviewed and when you were allocated a new target you did not know the reason for this. Possibly the target had ceased to justify a strike mission because a unit had moved or maybe the defences had been strengthened and it was now judged necessary to change the delivery platform to retain a sufficient degree of assuredness of success. You were not told because you did not need to know. The situation during my time on the V Force was that from a UK base we could make a high level transit outside EW radar cover and descend to low level to make an offensive penetration to the target at any point on the Soviet perimeter from East of North Cape to the Black Sea. We were then planned to recover to an allied airfield. I am told that this recovery plan was not always in place in later years as targets became more distant.

With a little imagination, a few line-of-sight calculations and some rough figures for Vulcan range and fuel consumption it is not difficult to arrive at the conclusion that most of the targets must have been in the Western Soviet Union. It is now widely known that most of the routes were planned to penetrate in the Baltic region many having transited Swedish airspace with the prior knowledge of the Swedish authorities. The attack planned was quite unlike anything that had ever happened before. It was no longer a massed raid on a single target but individual aircraft proceeding to separate targets. There was however a very high degree of coordination involved. As crews you were not aware of the details, but you were very strongly aware of the need to follow your planned route and adhere to the timings, if only to ensure that you were not caught by a “friendly” weapon detonation. What was also apparent when you examined your “war” flight plans was the stress laid upon the timing element because this was central to the penetration plan. What follows was told to me many years later by someone closely involved in the operational planning, for obvious reasons the crews were not made aware of these details. The planning hinged upon passing most of the force through one or two fairly small areas in a very short period of time. From this it could be deduced that some form of defence suppression would have occurred shortly prior to our arrival. As a USAF pilot once said to me “The most effective ECM is measured in Kilotons”. Once through the defended area, aircraft would proceed to their individual targets along a number of loosely defined corridors, leaving and joining them at various points along the route. The use of ECM in this phase would be reactive to any threats, reliance being placed upon remaining undetected in the general confusion and mayhem. Would the ECM equipment have been effective? Who really knows, we certainly felt it would help, but thank goodness never had to find out. Following weapon release the aircraft would climb to high level at the latest possible point to make the briefed recovery airfield. During this phase the ECM would be switched on in a supportive jamming role. After all having just released a nuclear weapon is hardly conducive to disguising your presence. We would then have landed at an allied airfield to await further orders. Would that airfield still be in existence? I have my doubts. Would there have been anywhere left to go home to? probably not. I am very glad that we never had to find out.

So there it is; that is the best I can do to answer your questions. The final one I suppose is “Was it all rational?” and the answer really must be “No it wasn’t”. However we would have gone, we would have done as we were ordered so maybe we bought some time for sense to prevail between the protagonists.

exmpa

[sealordlawrence]

Originally Posted by exmpa

There is much more to your question than you might realize. Firstly it is necessary to understand the guiding principle upon which Britain’s independent deterrent was based. It was to maintain a force capable of inflicting an unacceptable degree of damage upon a potential enemy in event that they attacked the UK. To put it simply, it meant the ability to effectively destroy Moscow. Other major cities would also be targeted, but Moscow would have priority.

The war plans fell into 2 categories, National and SACEUR. The National plan was a go it alone scenario, unlikely I know but it was the justification for the independent UK nuclear capability. The SACEUR Plan was a fully integrated plan that involved coordination of all strike forces. Obviously the latter plan was much larger and the range and type of target more varied. Crews were allocated targets under both plans. You only knew your own targets and no others but it would seem reasonable that there was some degree of duplication to ensure that priority targets were covered. Both plans were subject to regular review and revision and the targets allocated to individual crews would change. In addition there were the QRA targets which for obvious reasons had to be common to at least a number of crews. These targets would have to be constantly covered by the QRA force.

Targeting and tactics obviously evolved in response to improvements in air defence capability. The switch from high level to low level penetration is a prime example of this process. As I mentioned above, the plans were constantly reviewed and when you were allocated a new target you did not know the reason for this. Possibly the target had ceased to justify a strike mission because a unit had moved or maybe the defences had been strengthened and it was now judged necessary to change the delivery platform to retain a sufficient degree of assuredness of success. You were not told because you did not need to know. The situation during my time on the V Force was that from a UK base we could make a high level transit outside EW radar cover and descend to low level to make an offensive penetration to the target at any point on the Soviet perimeter from East of North Cape to the Black Sea. We were then planned to recover to an allied airfield. I am told that this recovery plan was not always in place in later years as targets became more distant.

With a little imagination, a few line-of-sight calculations and some rough figures for Vulcan range and fuel consumption it is not difficult to arrive at the conclusion that most of the targets must have been in the Western Soviet Union. It is now widely known that most of the routes were planned to penetrate in the Baltic region many having transited Swedish airspace with the prior knowledge of the Swedish authorities. The attack planned was quite unlike anything that had ever happened before. It was no longer a massed raid on a single target but individual aircraft proceeding to separate targets. There was however a very high degree of coordination involved. As crews you were not aware of the details, but you were very strongly aware of the need to follow your planned route and adhere to the timings, if only to ensure that you were not caught by a “friendly” weapon detonation. What was also apparent when you examined your “war” flight plans was the stress laid upon the timing element because this was central to the penetration plan. What follows was told to me many years later by someone closely involved in the operational planning, for obvious reasons the crews were not made aware of these details. The planning hinged upon passing most of the force through one or two fairly small areas in a very short period of time. From this it could be deduced that some form of defence suppression would have occurred shortly prior to our arrival. As a USAF pilot once said to me “The most effective ECM is measured in Kilotons”. Once through the defended area, aircraft would proceed to their individual targets along a number of loosely defined corridors, leaving and joining them at various points along the route. The use of ECM in this phase would be reactive to any threats, reliance being placed upon remaining undetected in the general confusion and mayhem. Would the ECM equipment have been effective? Who really knows, we certainly felt it would help, but thank goodness never had to find out. Following weapon release the aircraft would climb to high level at the latest possible point to make the briefed recovery airfield. During this phase the ECM would be switched on in a supportive jamming role. After all having just released a nuclear weapon is hardly conducive to disguising your presence. We would then have landed at an allied airfield to await further orders. Would that airfield still be in existence? I have my doubts. Would there have been anywhere left to go home to? probably not. I am very glad that we never had to find out.

So there it is; that is the best I can do to answer your questions. The final one I suppose is “Was it all rational?” and the answer really must be “No it wasn’t”. However we would have gone, we would have done as we were ordered so maybe we bought some time for sense to prevail between the protagonists.

exmpa

Thank you very much for the reply, it was far more detailed than I could ever have hoped for, thank you again.

[alertken]

Now its the submariners that address the "rational actor", knowing they'll have no home to go to.

My old man was 6ft.5ins and in his London Bobby helmet, say 7.ft. His arrest record was awful cos the bad guys faded when he appeared. Like you, exempa.

If those that harbour ill-will towards us think that you would discharge your duty, you won't have to. People take PhDs on this. That's the simple truth of it.

[LesB]

exmpa's reply gives a good (and nicely personal) account of the V force state of affairs in the 60s and makes interesting reading. And you have to believe that it would have worked - but only once.

Of course, the V force wasn't the only nuke equipped RAF asset on the SACEUR inventory. By the time the V's went in, the four, Germany based, Canberra Strike Sqns would have delivered their tactical instant sunshine to key points around the battle zone (most of Eastern Europe in fact). Certain of our QRA Canberras had targets that were intended to create the 'entry points' (mentioned by exmpa) for the UK based V's - the so-called 'gateways'. The idea was, I found out years later, that known and expected military concentrations, eg, missile batteries, radar sites, etc were to be nullifed - not countered, but nullified and quickly, within the first two hours of activities. This was to be carried out by the Canberras and their tac nukes clearing as wide a corridor as possible to facilitate V penetration.

The whole strategy, at least as we understood it on the Strike Sqns, was termed the Nuclear Tripwire. Looking back on it now it must have been obvious that the enemy at that time had massive superiority in numbers (not quality) so an attrition strategy was not feasible. If the Rifle Regiments had rolled onto the eastern plains of Germany an immediate, positve and hard nuclear response was the answer. Escalation was built-in from the 'off' so to speak. Although the Canberras were also tasked with secondary targets these were only expected to be addressed if the primary couldn't be nullified. You didn't do the primary and then go on to your secondary. In fact, most of the Canberra crews knew they wouldn't get far away from their primaries, but all of them expected to, anything else was unthinkable. The 'gateway' blokes would try to recover to Norway, Sweeden, Denmark, the other nuke Canberras - directly targeted on enemy installations to the east - would recover to Switzerland, France, Italy, etc because, the German bases were not expected to be there any more.

ECM? Not having. Plan was to go in low, hot and fast. Strike Sqn Canberra crews spent all their flying time in Germany practicing low-level transits, getting to know the country from 250 feet. In the event, hot transit would be 150 to 250 ft AGL and around 350 IAS. All flown to pre-selected way-points.

The above can't, and must not be considered definitive. As exmpa says, nobody was ever actually told the overall plan, just go there, do this. What I've given above is as a result of being there on a Strike Sqn and bits of info gathered in discussion with other blokes over the years since those far off MAD* days.

Then, in 69 the powers gave the UK nuclear deterrant to the navy. The skies of Germany became devoid of Strike Canberras, the Phantoms, Bucaneers and Harriers arrived - and it all changed.

As exmpa alludes in his posts, it wasn't a pleasant time and not really 'visible' to the general public so those days don't get the plaudits they deserve. But it's what we were there for.


*Apt word, but stands for Mutually Assured Destruction in this context.

.

[Vulcan903]

Is there a book that covers all this in depth "history" gateways, RS - phoning in from Telephone Call Boxes etc. It would make a good read!

[sealordlawrence]

LesB, thanks for your post, another great incite! I love hearing about the intended strategy for all the sexy kit we see on these pages. As said by many many others, thank go nothing ever came of it!

Incidently tripwire was eventually replaced by gradual escalation. The idea behind tripwire was a deterrent, mess with us and get fried basically. Gradual escalation was intended to give leaders time to come to some sort of 'other' conclusion (although it has never been explained to me what that 'other' was supposed to be) whilst just Germany got fried.

[Wessex Fan]

Thanks everyone, this thread is a shining example of the best this forum has to offer.

Thanks guys for being up the sharp end, but thank God you never had to do it for real!

Eric

[efiste2]

Have to add my thanks too. this is invaluable info from the actual people who were there and stood ready to do the job, better than many books in my view................thanks again

[WL747]

Just to let you know that I have had probably the most pleasant 15 mins on the forum ever reading this thread. Thanks Les B and exmpa for such an eye opening account of potential operations in the event of the Cold War turning hot.

I'm too young to have experienced the tensions of the Cuban missile crisis, or to be able to appreciate fully the tensions in the 70's and 80's, but if it sends a chill down my back thinking of it now, I can imagine how much worse for those who would have to perform the duty of executing a nuclear attack.

The most chilling part is the thought of perhaps having nothing to return to....

Thank you guys, it's been entertaining and informative

[Vulcan903]

And if this sort of interesting information is not recorded, it will be lost one day in the future!

[TwinOtter23]

Originally Posted by Vulcan903

And if this sort of interesting information is not recorded, it will be lost one day in the future!

Bill O’Sullivan [the Cockpit-Fest organiser] at the Newark Air Museum has been partially doing this by recording the Log Book details from ex-Vulcan aircrew that flew XM594, which is displayed at the museum. This exercise was started during their “Tribute to the V-Force” event several years ago.

I believe that the Bedford [Thurleigh] 30 day dispersal mentioned earlier in the thread may even have been by a crew with XM594.

There was some talk via the museum Dispersal newsletter that Newark’s new proposed hangar project could have a Cold War aspect to it relating to both the Vulcan and Shackleton airframes. The Shackleton already has two books published, ‘Duty Carried Out’ and ‘Dedication to Duty’, which include details of sub hunting ops / patrols and FALLEX missions from the early 1960s.

http://www.newarkairmuseum.org/shop.htm

[AvgasDinosaur]

This thread is a tribute to all thats good in this forum.
I just wish I owned a publishing company to commission books by the two major contributors. Thank you gentlemen, sincerely.
There is also this link which may be of interest.
http://www.spyflight.co.uk/51sqn.htm
Hope it helps
Be lucky
David

[exmpa]

There is also this link which may be of interest.
http://www.spyflight.co.uk/51sqn.htm

Yes Spyflight is pretty good



As far as it goes that is......

exmpa

[jbritchford]

What is the consensus on the switch from an airborne deterrent to using SLBMs?
It is the more effective option, or does using a bomber force give more flexibility?

[LesB]

Originally Posted by exmpa

Yes Spyflight is pretty good
As far as it goes that is...... exmpa

I'll second that.

The bloke that runs Spyflight is a nice fellow, (we've e-mailed), but some of the 'facts' he has there are just not on. Not his fault I guess but it shows what taking other blokes printed 'stories' can do. Especially that bloke Lashmar! Trouble is Lashmar's not wrong, he's just not right! But then, who really cares? Not me.

[atr42]

Please add my thanks to those above. These accounts are far better than anything else for understanding exactly what went on and why. Could read them all day if I didn't have to go to work in a minute!

[sealordlawrence]

Originally Posted by jbritchford

What is the consensus on the switch from an airborne deterrent to using SLBMs?
It is the more effective option, or does using a bomber force give more flexibility?

It was definatly the right thing to do. British air bases were vulnerable to to Soviet IRBM's with short flight times. At Sea SSBN's were not especially with NATO naval supremacy.

[Mr Creosote]

Originally Posted by exmpa

. We were then planned to recover to an allied airfield. I am told that this recovery plan was not always in place in later years as targets became more distant.
exmpa

Hope you don't mind my asking, but how did you feel about that?

[exmpa]

Mr Creosote

I am told that this recovery plan was not always in place in later years as targets became more distant.

I really am not qualified comment on that because what I wrote is what I was told, not something I had to confront personally. Maybe someone from the later years will come along and be able to answer your question.

exmpa

[DrD]

As an anecdotal extra - my understanding is that much of the detailed mapping required to plan the routes into Russia was actually extracted from detailed Maps the Germans made during WWII.

They provided the topographical data required for the proposed low level flight plans - which were described as hedge hopping in one famous newspaper article by Chapman Pincher - after he'd been taken on a demonstration flight to prove the V-Force had low level capability.

I think my parents still have that clipping from the paper!

[alertken]

re. efiste2's starter: Chapters XVIII, Dispersal Techniques, and XX, the QRA Era, of Wynn's Deterrent History, has much on this. UK's reliance on Barbarossa maps, confined West of the Volga, was one reason for the 24/7/57 UK/US MoU on nuke supply (Project "E") and target co-ordination (Wynn, Ch.XVI,P.262: SAC/RAF "inextricably linked"). RAF could find Counter-Value targets, but not Counter-Force. Low-level ops were not possible before GD TFR was fitted, 1964/65, by when US satellite data was available.

Prof.P.Hennessy's work, inc. 0197264220, Cabinets and the Bomb (original Papers), 2007, has RAF with up to 104 targets in the 1/7/58-23/5/1963 period (in SIOP from 1/10/61), "doubled-up" US/UK (hence "making the rubble bounce") (some trebled by the dozen or so Mirage IV which might penetrate). Healey's Memoirs have by end-64 just the Moscow criterion, which is why Chevaline had to be done, to penetrate the target intended to be covered by an ABM.